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Barristers and Barricades:
Prospects for the Lawyer
as a Reformer
H. W. Arthurs*
I define myself, in no particular order of precedence, as a
lawyer and as a reformer. Most law professors, a goodly pro-
portion of law students, even a modest number of practicing
lawyers might define themselves in this way. I want to ex-
plore the implications of this self-portrait: how do we validate
our credentials as reformers within a profession whose con-
servatism is legendary?
At the outset, I confess that I am going to beg the ques-
tions of who is a reformer and what is reform. Naturally, a
reformer thinks of himself as an agent of change; for any in-
dividual, reform represents forward movement towards his
vision of society. But alas, our individual visions of society
are so varied, our ability to evaluate the impact of change so
limited, and our calculus of its relative costs and benefits so
differential, that I could hardly hope to persuade everyone
that any given proposal dear to my own heart is in fact"reform". One man's millenium is another's hell.
Let me try to prove by example the wisdom of not defining
reform. First, consider the "reform" of administrative law
which has been the focus of much lawyerly attention in re-
cent years.' The procedures of administrative tribunals in
*Dean, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. An earlier version of this paper
was presented as the Catriona Gibson Memorial Lecture at the Faculty of Law,
Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., Sept. 27, 1974. D.A. Basskin (Osgoode II)
provided research and editorial assistance in its revision for publication.
Ont. 1 First Report of the Royal Commission Inquiry into Civil Rights, (Toronto:
Queen's Printer, 1968) - McRuer Report; R. Reid, Administrative Law and Prac-
tice (Toronto: Butterworths, 1971) at 461-68; W. Tarnapolsky, The Canadian Bill of
Rights (2d ed. Ottawa: McClelland and Stewart, 1975) at 222-89; S. deSmith,
Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3d ed. London: Stevens and Sons,
1973), J. Willis, The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values
(1968), 18 U.T.L.J. 351; H. Molot, Administrative Law (1972), 5 Ottawa L. Rev.
411; I. Christie, "The Nature of the Lawyer's Role in the Administrative Process",
in Law Society of Upper Canada, SpecialLectures (Toronto: R. de Boo, 1971) at 1.
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Ontario have now been regularized and judicialized, and their
decisions made more accessible to the reviewing jurisdiction
of the courts.2 I dare say that a majority of lawyers and
nonlawyers alike would view this as a substantial reform.
3 I
do not. To my way of thinking, much that has happened has
served merely to inhibit the effectiveness of administrative
agencies in their job of curbing excessive private power and
promoting orderly social and economic change. I therefore
feel that recent changes in administrative law have been the
converse of reform. Or consider current proposals to replace
automobile accident litigation with some form of insurance
and compensation scheme. 4 I think that such a scheme
would be a reform, but a number of opponents of these
changes (not all of whom are members of the automobile ac-
cident bar) think it is just the opposite.5 They contend that
the proposed scheme will be costly and cumbersome, that
many individuals will be denied adequate compensation for
their injuries, that the right to litigate is a fundamental civil
right, and that many of the objectives of the proposed
scheme could have been accomplished by more modest
measures with none of these allegedly harmful effects.
I mention these examples, I stress again, not to
demonstrate the rightness of my position but rather to il-
lustrate the difficulty of talking sensibly about the role of the
legal profession in relation to reform because of the difficulty
of agreeing upon exactly what reform is.
But if I am unwilling to define reform, I am nonetheless
quite prepared to consider how lawyers think about it, what
they do about it, and why they think and act as they do.
In particular, I want to examine three factors which in-
fluence the beliefs and conduct of lawyers as reformers:
first, the formal institutional framework of the legal profes-
2 The Statutory Powers Procedure Act, S.O. 1971, c.47; The Judicial Review Pro-
cedure Act, S.O. 1971, c.48; Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.), c.10.
3 See, e.g., D. Mullan, Reform of Judicial Review of Administrative Action - The
Ontario Way (1974), 12 O.H.L.J. 125; R. Atkey, The Statutory Powers Procedure
Act 1971, (1972) 10 O.H.L.J. 155; but see Willis, Canadian Administrative Law in
Retrospect (1974), U.T.L.J. at 225.
4 B. Dunlop, No-Fault Automobile Insurance and the Negligence Action: An Expen-
sive Anomaly (1975), 13 O.H.L.J. 439; O'Connell, No-Fault Insurance for all Ac-
cidents (1975), 13 O.H.L.J. 461; Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on
Motor Vehicle Accident Compensation (Toronto: Queen's Printer, 1973); T. Ison,
Tort Liability and Social Insurance (1969), 19 U.T.L.J. 614; T. Ison, "Contem-
porary Developments and Reform in Personal Injury Compensation", in Law
Society of Upper Canada. SpecialLectures (Toronto: R. de Boo, 1973) at 521.
5 See, e.g., A. Linden, Tort Law As Ombudsman (1973), 51 C.B.R. 155; U. Grif-
fiths, Don't Abolish Tort Law in Auto Accident Compensation (1969), 12 C.B.J.
187 at 190.
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sion, the law society; second, its official ideology, the Code
of Professional Conduct; and third, the informal beliefs and
habits, the culture, of the profession. Of course, I do not for
a moment deny the importance of many other factors - in-
dividual personality, educational background, economic
temptation, investment in professional skill, social pressure.
All of these help to shape our views towards reform, and to
define the way in which we act, or fail to act, in accordance
with those views. But these tend to be rather personal con-
siderations. What I want to explore are the factors which
operate more-or-less universally across the legal profession.
I turn first to the law society. Membership in a provincial
law society is required of everyone who wishes to practice
law in a Canadian province.6 These law societies enjoy a
statutory mandate to govern the legal profession through
control over the admission and discipline of their members.7
They are thus theoretically in a position either to force or for-
bid lawyers to be reformers, or at least to place the profes-
sion as a whole on record as favouring or opposing reform.
But, I suggest, a provincial law society does not, and
should not, directly address itself to the issue of reform.
An author of some prominence several years ago tendered
to the Law Society of Upper Canada a prospectus for a pro-
posed history of the Society.8 He had for some time, he said,
been trying to account for what he perceived to be a greater
devotion in Canada than in the United States to the cause of
liberty and progress. In seeking to trace the elusive "spoor"
(as he termed it) of this idea, he found that the trail led him to
the Law Society of Upper Canada as one of the major
sources of progressive concern in this country. By contrast,
even the most casual student of current radical demonology
will immediately recognize the Law Society of Upper Canada
as a sinister influence retarding the liberation of the masses
in general and of legal workers in particular.9
One might already have inferred that I am loathe to
subscribe to either of these caricatures of the Law Society.
6 See, e.g., The Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.50.
7 Id. ss. 10, 55.
8 Preface, Special Commemorative Issue (1797-1971) (1972), 6 Law Society of Up-
per Canada Gazette at v.
9 See, e.g., Farquar, Sault Secretaries Unite (1974), 1 Law Union News No. 5;
Swaigen, Bencher Election (1975), 2 Law Union News No. 2; Her, Law Union Pro-
tests L.S.U.C. Scabbing (1975), 2 Law Union News No. 4; Glick, Law Society
Meeting HighlightedbyL.U. Motions (1976), 3 Law Union News, No. 2.
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This is not to deny that the Law Society could use its con-
siderable influence on the side of either reform or reaction,
assuming that one could determine which was which. But it
is this very conundrum which leads me to make the case for
a Law Society which confines its concerns rather strictly to
its statutory obligation of policing the admission of lawyers
to practice and their professional conduct. 10
Of course it would be nice to have the Law Society deploy
its battalions behind me as I march forward with a banner of
reform, bearing mottoes which I have selected and heraldic
devices which feature a law teacher rampant on a field of
social engineering. But because I also believe that the Law
Society should be internally democratic, and responsive to
the wishes of its members, I must face the possibility that I
may not be leading the battalions, but confronting them in
an adversary posture, and that the Law Society (and
everyone who must belong to it) may be put on record as
favouring positions which are contrary to my particular vision
of reform.
I am prepared, therefore, to view the Law Society as a
kind of institutional Switzerland within whose neutral boun-
daries clashing factions may meet, within whose deep cof-
fers public trust will be safeguarded, and whose towering
peaks seem a little remote from daily political controversy.
And yet I am not so naive as to believe that the provincial
law societies can, in fact, ever be disregarded in a realistic
assessment of the prospects for lawyer-reformers. Admis-
sion requirements, for example, help to determine the
socio-economic composition of the profession and thus, in
part, its general sympathy towards reform. Standards of pro-
fessional conduct set by the law society could forbid fee-
cutting or require participation in legal aid, thus constricting
or expanding the strata of society served by most lawyers
and the range of experiences which might help to form their
attitudes. And lawyers who are benchers of the law society
may, for that reason, speak as authority figures and com-
mand respect, both within and beyond the profession, for
their personal views on issues of reform.
I must therefore consider how the law societies influence
the beliefs and behaviour of their members, even when they
do not directly proclaim their positions on specific controver-
sial issues of reform.
10 Cf. Thorn, The Nature and Function of the Law Society of Upper Canada (1974),
8 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 173.
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So far as admission to practice is concerned, the law
societies exact no oath of ideological conformity. With but a
single recorded exception, in British Columbia in 1949,11 the
Canadian legal profession has accepted within its ranks
anyone meeting standard admission requirements. 12 Even
the undefinable requirement of "good character", so far as I
am aware, has not been used to keep out radicals, let alone
reformers.
A law society has the right to discipline for "professional
misconduct" or "conduct unbecoming" a lawyer.' 3 These
terms are, like "good character", so open-ended that they
could conceivably be used to harrass individuals who do not
hew to some ideological line laid down by the society. But
they have not been used in this way. Indeed, their very
vagueness has caused professional governing bodies to
move cautiously in all discipline matters, except the most ob-
vious one of breach of trust. 14 In an effort to guide lawyers
into patterns of acceptable conduct, many law societies
issue non-binding rulings, which are quite specific in their
content. 15 However, breach of these rulings does not, per se,
constitute violation of the statutory standard. One of the rul-
ings frequently adopted by the law societies was the Code of
Legal Ethics of the Canadian Bar Asociation. 16 This docu-
ment was the essence of innocuity: the Bar Association had
no power to proclaim or enforce ethical standards, because
no one was required to belong to it; the language of the
Code was platitudininous, archaic, and sometimes con-
tradictory; since its adoption in 1920, the Code had never
been cited in any reported case or disciplinary proceeding,
the subject of debate within the Bar Association, or of revi-
sion by any competent authority. Yet there it remained, until
very recently, as a guide to Canada's lawyers.
Fortunately, it has now been replaced. In September,
1974, the Bar Association adopted a new Code of Profes-
sional Conduct which is much more contemporary in tone
11 Re LegalProfession Act, Re Martin, [194911 D.L.R. 106 (Benchers of Law Socie-
ty of B.C.) aff'd on appeal sub. nom. Martin v. Law Society of B.C., [195013
D.L.R. 173 (B.C.C.A.).
12 See, e.g., The Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.27.
13 Id. s.34.
14 H. Arthurs, Discipline in the Legal Profession in Ontario (1969), 7 O.H.L.J. 235;
Orkin, ProfessionalAutonomy and the Public Interest. A Study of the Law Socie-
ty of Upper Canada (unpubl'd. D. Jur. Thesis, York U., 1972).
I See, e.g., Law Society of Upper Canada, Professional Conduct Handbook
(1975).
16 Id., Ruling No. 1
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and conception. 17 In Ontario, the Law Society's recently-
acquired statutory authority"' to adopt a code of ethics has
been exercised in order to adopt in principle the new Cana-
dian Bar Association Code.' 9 When formally promulgated
across the country, it will be the closest thing to an official
ideology that Canadian lawyers have had. What does it say
about reform?
The new Code of Professional Conduct was drafted during
a period when many of the fundamental assumptions of the
legal profession (not to say of our legal system and of society
generally) were being brought into question. Its authors
realized that the Code would not be applied exclusively (or
perhaps even primarily) to lawyers leading conventional
careers in conventional law firms in the service of conven-
tional clients. Rather it was a new breed of young lawyers,
some of whom were determined to use law to change socie-
ty, that would have to live with the new rules of professional
conduct.
Many of the new rules legitimate the reformer's role within
the profession. Lawyers are urged to participate in such ac-
titivities as "law reform, continuing education, tutorials,
legal aid programmes, community legal services," and a
variety of professional activities.20 This encouragement of
responsible citizenship is complemented by some very
specific directions to use "courtesy and good faith" in rela-
tionships with clients and other lawyers in the course of pro-
fessional business.
21
The Code announces that "the lawyer should encourage
public respect for and try to improve the administration of
justice. '"22 These contrapuntal, sometimes contradictory,
themes of "respect" and reform are juxtaposed throughout
the explanatory notes that follow. The lawyer is assumed to
have "a basic commitment to the concept of equal justice for
all within an open, ordered and impartial system.
'23
However, public respect will only be maintained at the price
17 Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct (1974) [hereinafter cited
as C.B.A., C.P.C.].
18 The Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.55; R.R.O. 1970, Reg. 556, s.23(1).
19 (1975) 9 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 256.
2 C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 14, para. 5.
Id., Rule 16.
22 Id., Rule 12.
21 Id., Rule 12, para. 1.
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of "constant efforts ... to improve the administration of
justice." '2 4 The lawyer's unique position enables him to iden-
tify the shortcomings in our system, "but his criticisms and
proposals should be bona fide and reasoned. ' 25 There is a
special obligation on the lawyer, the Code asserts, to avoid
unwarranted criticism of tribunals whose members cannot
answer back.26 His very status as a lawyer places a special
obligation upon him not to undermine public confidence in
the legal system, "but for the same reason he should not
hesitate to speak out where he sees an injustice."
27
There is in all of this an implicit assumption, occasionally
made explicit, that the lawyer is both more and less than any
other citizen. He is more in that he has affirmative obliga-
tions to seek reform; he is less in that he is inhibited in the
means he can use in aid of the causes he supports.
It must be remembered that, once the Code has been
adopted by the law society, a lawyer is subject to profes-
sional discipline for violations.28 But what can one predict
about the likely enforcement of the Code against two in-
dividuals, one of whom has vigorously and publicly de-
nounced a tribunal whose decision, he honestly feels,
amounts to a grave injustice, while the other has merely
failed to assist the Bar Association in importuning the
government for legislative reforms? I suspect that it is the
lawyer-critic who is more likely to be disciplined, if either is.
But I doubt whether either would be. 2
9
This prediction is not based on any cynicism about the law
society. On the contrary, its premise is that the society has
enough good sense to avoid using its disciplinary power in
what must ultimately be a political, rather than a purely pro-
fessional, context.
And yet, is it always possible to divorce the political from
the professional?
The Code places special emphasis upon the lawyer's
obligation to act with integrity. Taking the position that in-
tegrity is indivisible, the Code notes that conduct "whether
within or outside the professional sphere" which would im-
24 1d.
2 Id., Rule 12, para. 2.
21 Id., Rule 12, para. 4.
27 Id., Rule 12, para. 3.
23 (1975) 9 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 256.
2 For a recent and notorious example of a lawyer found in contempt for public
criticism of a decision, but not (as of the date of writing) professionally disciplined
for this criticism, see Queen v. Atlantic Sugar Refineries, Re Ouellett,
(unreported, 1976, Que. S.C.).
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pair a client's confidence in a lawyer, may be grounds for
discipline.30 The Code disclaims any intention to deal with"private or extra-professional activities ... which do not br-
ing . . . professional integrity or competence into ques-
tion, '31 but it is easy to imagine that in a bad case the line
might be drawn in such a way as to stigmatize certain kinds
of conduct in which a reformer might wish to engage.
A lawyer who participates in an unruly demonstration
which results in a conviction for obstructing the police, or a
lawyer with radical moral or sexual views which he preaches
or practices in some way which attracts public controversy,
or a lawyer who subscribes to a political philosophy of the
left which gains him notoriety and involves near-brushes
with the law - any of these lawyers might conceivably be
accused of conduct which (in the words of the Code) is
"dishonourable or questionable" and "reflect[s] adversely
to a greater or lesser degree upon the integrity of the profes-
sion and the administration of law and justice as a whole."
'32
And yet I do not mean to overstate the case. I know of no in-
stance where an individual was put out of the profession for
behaviour of this sort, although a number of potentially con-
troversial lawyers have courted such discipline.
3 3
The position of the lawyer-reformer who has a conscien-
tious aversion to a particular oppressive law is a difficult one
indeed. "When acting as a professional advisor," the Code
says, "the lawyer must never knowingly assist or encourage
any ... crime or illegal conduct. ' 34 While a specific excep-
tion is made to this rule to permit the lawyer to become in-
volved in bona fide test cases,35 the bit of the principal rule is
potentially severe. The lawyer who organizes a campaign of
civil disobedience against a wicked law may have en-
couraged "illegal conduct" in violation of the Code.3 6 On the
other hand if he simply counsels obedience to every law,
however unconscionable, he betrays his own fundamental
values. How do lawyer-reformers resolve the dilemma? We
have precedents to guide us. Gandhi was a lawyer; he was
30 C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 1, para. 2.
31 Id., Rule 1, para. 3.
1 Id., Rule 1, para. 2.
33 Cf. Re Nova and Law Society of B.C. (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 89 (B.C.S.C.) (Bar-
rister acted for unspecified persons in negotiating the return of stolen bonds with
police, disbarred for "unprofessional conduct").
3 C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 2, para. 6.
3' Id., Rule 2, para. 7.
3 Editorial, Civil Disobedience and the Lawyer (1967), 1 Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette 5.
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the most effective exponent of civil disobedience. 37 The Ger-
man jurists of the 1930's offer another sort of precedent;
they helped to preserve the respectability and regularity of
the Nazi regime by counselling compliance with its laws.38 If
we were to reach a situation so desperate that either analogy
applied, I suspect the Code of Professional Conduct would
provide us with little guidance, and we would make our in-
dividual decisions as citizens, not as lawyers.
The new Code does help to guide us, however, so long as
it is possible to work within the system. We tend to associate
political trials with the current convulsions of American
society, but we often forget that important historical
precedents exist in the Anglo-Canadian tradition. Relief from
the burdens of feudalism, challenges to absolute royal
power, protests against the overreaching of the laws of libel
and sedition, slow steps towards freedom of conscience:
these causes have been advanced in the courtroom as well
as in the political forum in both England 39 and Canada.4 But
a political trial is seldom a calm and rational search for truth
and justice. It is often intensely emotional and tests to the
limit the commitment of both counsel and judge to orderly
process as an independent and higher-order value in our
legal system.
Thus the advocate in the crucible of a political trial may be
fettered by certain strictures of the Code of Professional
Conduct. To be sure, there is no necessary reason why, even
in such circumstances, he cannot both comply with his
obligation to treat the tribunal "with courtesy and respect"
and "represent his client resolutely, honourably and within
the limits of the law." '41 But the requirement of courtesy and
3 Editorial, supra note 36, at 7; but see contra, Correspondence (1967), 1 Law
Society of Upper Canada Gazette 44; W. MacGuigan, The Lawyer and Civil
Disobodience (1971), 5 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 252.
1 D. Ruschmeyer, Lawyers and Their Society (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1973) 180 etseq..
3 See, e.g., Wilkes v. Wood (General Warrants case) (1763), 98 E.R. 489; Entick v.
Carrington (1965), 95 E.R. 807; Christie v. Leachinsky, [194711 All E.R. 567; Liver-
side v. Anderson, 11942] A.C. 206. See also Heuston, Liversidge v. Anderson in
Retrospect (1970) 86 L.Q.R. 33 for the unique history of this case. Although
Atkin's view was the sole dissenting voice, and "may not have been 'correct'
within the context of that decision itself, it has yet had more profound influence
on public law than the speeches of any of the majority Law Lords."
10 K. McNaught, "Political Trials in Canada" in M.L. Friedland ed., Courts and
Trials: A Multi-Disciplinary Approach, (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975) at
137; see also Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Quebec, [19571 S.C.R. 285; Saumur
v. Quebec and A.-G. Quebec, [195312 S.C.R. 299; Roncarelliv. Duplessis, 119591
S.C.R. 121.
41 C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 8.
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respect pre-supposes even-handed and sympathetic treat-
ment from the bench. There is at least the possibility that a
lawyer may be provoked into discourtesy and disrespect by
what he perceives, perhaps inaccurately but nonetheless
sincerely, to be a display of judicial hostility or unfairness.
Two wrongs do not, of course, make a right. But what the
Code proscribes as a "consistent pattern of rude, pro-
vocative or disruptive conduct ' 42 may appear quite different-
ly when set against the background of judicial conduct which
is something less than exemplary. 43 For the reformer of pas-
sionate temperament, the political trial is a moment of
special danger.
Curiously, the rule concerning "impartiality and conflict of
interests'"44 may also present difficult problems for the
lawyer who seeks to use litigation as a vehicle for reform. A
group may wish to impugn the constitutionality of a statute
or to obtain a favourable interpretation of a legal rule. If the
group itself cannot sue, an individual may be selected to
raise the point either by suing in his individual capacity, or by
acting as representative of the group. In either case, the
lawyer will normally be retained and paid by the group,
although proceedings are prosecuted in the name of that one
individual. It is he who is, technically, the lawyer's client.
But what happens when the interests of the individual and
those of the sponsoring group diverge? To whom, then,
does the lawyer owe his loyalty? For example, it may be that
a nominal plaintiff is offered a favourable settlement of his
claim, because the defendent would rather pay off that one
individual than confront a multitude of persons similarly
placed. What should the lawyer advise in such a case? If he
is genuinely devoted to the interests of his individual client,
he may well be prepared to recommend settlement. Indeed,
another provision of the Code tells him he must seek a settle-
ment whenever the circumstances permit. 45 On the other
hand, the reality of the matter is that the lawyer is being re-
tained by the group, and that its interest is in having a par-
ticular point of law ventilated, as well as (or instead of) ad-
vancing the position of the particular member who was
selected as a nominal plaintiff. If the lawyer is prepared to
acknowledge this reality, he will be cool to settlement and
41 Id., Rule 8, para. 12.
Cf. R. v. Shumiatcher (1967), 64 D.L.R. (2d) 24 (Sask, Q.B.); Hazard, Securing
Courtroom Decorum, (1970) 80 Yale L.J. 433.
C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 5.
'* Id., Rule 2, para. 5; Rule 8, para. 6
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tend to push the case forward for authoritative adjudication.
The point I make is simply that the use of the courts to ad-
vance group interests may place the lawyer-reformer in a
very awkward position.
4 6
Nor should it be thought that the only possible conflict in
which the lawyer might find himself is between individuals
and their groups. He himself may be involved in an "outside
interest" other than the practice of law, such as a career in
politics or writing or broadcasting, through which he ad-
vances his reformist views. But the lawyer must not allow his
involvement in an outside interest to impair the exercise of
his independent professional judgment on behalf of his
clients. Here the Code prescribes candour: "an overriding
social, political, economic or other consideration arising from
the outside interests [which] might influence the lawyer's
judgment [is required to be disclosed]." '47 The actual applica-
tion of this rule is, again, problematic. For example, a lawyer
who personally is committed to freer abortion laws may be
asked to prosecute someone charged under the present law;
a lawyer involved in the women's movement and committed
to seeking legislative changes to faciliatate rape convictions,
may be asked to defend an alleged rapist.48 Disclosure of her
outside views would appear to be required, but it is obviously
an awkward situation for both lawyer and client.
Turning from litigation to political activity, the Code im-
poses only a few limits on reformers. Lawyers seeking
changes in the law must disclose whether they are acting in
their own interest, that of a client, or in the public interest:
49
lobbyists must not masquerade as academic critics. If the
reform-minded lawyer should actually win public office, he
will be held to standards of conduct as high as those required
of practitioners. But the Code does not purport to deal with
"the execution of the official responsibilities of a lawyer
holding public office" except to the extent that his conduct
in office "reflects adversely on his integrity or his profes-
sional competence." 50 This proviso is important because it
D. Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School
Desegregation Litigation (1976), 85 Yale L.J. 470.
47 C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 6, para. 2.
13 P. Zylberberg, Writ Served in Glick Wrongful Dismissal Lawsuit (1976), 3 Law
Union News No. 2 (radical lawyer fired over refusal to defend accused rapist); Mc-
Cormack, Chernovsky and Omatsu, How Should a Progressive Practice Be Run]
(1976), 3 Law Union News No. 2; P. Zylberberg, The Rapist: Your Kind of Client:
2 Law Union News No. 4.
C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 9, para. 4.
SOId., Rule 9, para. 8.
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recognizes that public officials may have to be outspoken in
rallying support for their political objectives, and to engage in
otherwise impermissible criticism of laws and legal institu-
tions.
And finally, what of reform within the profession itself?
Recently many reformers have focussed upon the need to
develop new systems for the delivery of legal services. The
Code of Professional Conduct generally appears to endorse
efforts to improve delivery systems: "Lawyers" it says,"should make legal services available to the public in an effi-
cient and convenient manner. " 51 But this general admonition
is hedged about with a number of qualifying commandments
which could conceivably detract from its effectiveness.
Advertising, fee-cutting, even high public visibility, are all
discouraged. 52 However, certain privileges are extended to
lawyers acting on behalf of "a community service group" or
otherwise seeking "in good faith" to make legal services
"available more efficiently, economically and conveniently
than they would otherwise have been and ... not primarily
advancing [their] own economic interests."
53
In one critical respect, the new Code leaves reformers with
cold comfort. Lawyers preserve their "general right to
decline particular employment" although they are told to "be
slow to exercise [it] if the probable result [would] leave the
potential client unrepresented. ' 54 A lawyer for example,
should not decline to act because a cause is "unpopular or
notorious." 55 But the fact remains that he may do so; no
lawyer will be disciplined for declining the retainer of a client
of whose cause he disapproves.
The most likely result of the new Code's provisions is that
lawyers will continue to gravitate towards clients with whose
views they feel comfortable. Reformist clients will most
often be represented by reformist lawyers. This likelihood
underlines the need for a pluralistic bar. Uniformity of belief,
background and demeanor, coupled with the right to decline
employment, would undoubtedly leave many potential
clients without effective representation. In one respect, the
new Code makes an important advance in securing diversity
within the bar. Discrimination on the grounds of race, creed,
5l Id., Rule 13.
5 Id., Rule 13, para. 4-8, but see Merchant v. Law Society of Saskatchewan (1972),
32 D.L.R. (3d) 178 (Sask. C.A.).
3 Id., Rule 13, para. 10; cf. op. cit. supra, note 15, Ruling 3(3).
4C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 13, para. 9.
15 Id., Rule 13, para. 4.
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colour, national origin or sex is specifically outlawed both in
the employment of lawyers and articled students, and in
other relationships amongst members of the profession.
56
I have taken the trouble of examining the Code of Profes-
sional Conduct in some detail because it represents one of
the few authoritative statements of the ideology of the legal
profession. While undoubtedly other provisions of the Code
demonstrate a lingering conservatism, and while in a given
situation a particular reformsit lawyer might be found to have
violated a particular norm of professional conduct, on
balance there is in the bar's system of formal beliefs much
that would legitimate, and little that would inhibit, the ac-
tivities of a reformist lawyer.
Many of these provisions have emerged as part of the
bar's official ideology only with the adoption of the new
Code, but the way has been paved for their official accep-
tance over the years by the statements of many authority
figures within the profession to the same effect. Does this
mean that all lawyers are now deeply committed to the cause
of reform? Porbably not.
Ill
Like any other organized group, the legal profession does
not live exclusively by its formal rules. To be sure, these rules
represent a statement of aspiration. They are used to
educate members of the group and to impress outsiders with
its sincerity. But there are other, informal influences which
often overwhelm the formal rules. Collectively, these in-
fluences can be described as the culture of the profession,
the third main context within which I intend to explore the
role of the lawyer as reformer.
Let me explain what I mean by the culture of the profes-
sion.57 The culture of a society defines certain values as fun-
damental; these values imply that particular norms of
behaviour will be followed; and symbols are adopted to re-
mind us that we are to adhere to these values and behave in
an acceptable fashion. Sometimes the values, behaviour
patterns and symbols are officially promulgated and en-
forced; often they come to be widely, even universally, ac-
6 Id., Rule 14, para. 4; op. cit. supra, note 15, Ruling 36.
7 See generally Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions (1957),
Am. Soc. Rev. 194; Lortie, "Professional Socialization", in Vollmer & Mills eds.
Professionalization, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1966) at 98; E.C.
Hughes, Men and Their Work (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1958).
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cepted by a slow evolutionary process; sometimes the same
processes produce cultural change. A profession can be
seen as a culture within the larger culture, sharing its values,
norms and symbols, to be sure, but also developing its own
distinctive characteristics. It is this sense of distinctiveness
which causes members of the profession to set themselves
apart from laymen, and which causes laymen to perceive
professionals as a group of whom a typical behaviour can be
expected.
At this juncture, I do not mean to indicate whether a
distinctive professional culture is, on balance, good or bad. I
merely want to make the point that it does exist, and must be
reckoned with as an important force in shaping the
reformer's role within the legal profession.
What are the fundamental values of the legal culture? One
author's attempt to describe in universal terms the values of
all professional cultures seems to apply with particular ac-
curacy to the Canadian bar at this moment in time:
Foremost amongst [the profession's] values is the essential
worth of the service which the professional group extends to the
community. The profession considers that the service is a social
good and that community welfare would be immeasurably im-
paired by its absence .... [T]he proposition that in all service-
related matters the professional group is infinitely wiser than the
laity is regarded as beyond argument. Likewise nonarguable is
the proposition that acquisition by the professional group of a
service monopoly would inevitably produce social pro-
gress .... 58
Set this description beside the Preface to our new Code of
Professional Responsibility, and see how nearly congruent
the two are:
The legal profession [says the Preface to the Code] has
developed over the centuries to meet a public need for legal ser-
vices .... The Code of Professional Responsibility ... can only
be understood and applied in the light of its primary concern for
the public interest. This principle is implicit in the legislative
grants of self-government [to the provincial law
societies] .... 59
Here we encounter some convictions which run deep into
the culture of the profession, and which very much affect
the role of the reformer.
5 Greenwood, "The Concept of Professionalization" in Vollmer & Mills, op. cit.
supra, note 56 at 16.
Preface, C.B.A., C.P.C. at vii.
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Consider, first, our commitment to the essential worth of
lawyers and law in society. We are very fond of the phrase
"the rule of law and not of men." Of course everyone
deprecates arbitrary, whimsical, bureaucratic action, and
favours predictable, constitutional official conduct. But note
how we have framed the phrase: we say we support the rule
of "law", although it is lawyers who are actually ruling. The
implication is that when a particular group of men, called
lawyers, are performing their particular service they are no
longer mere men, with all the human failings of mere men.
They are now servants of an abstraction called law and ex-
ecutors of a social order they interpret but do not construct.
The point is that we lawyers have made a non- controver-
sial cliche into a rallying cry, at least in part because it verifies
and legitimates our social role. Reforms which seek to assign
traditional lawyer roles to non-lawyers who may have other
relevant skills to deploy are transgressions, not against the
rule of lawyers, but against the rule of law. And lawyers who
advocate such reforms may be seen by their colleagues as
striking at the heart of their profession, as blaspheming
against its holy writ. A recent debate, which I have already
mentioned, saw a meeting of Canadian lawyers solemnly
vote to endorse automobile accident litigation as the bir-
thright of free Canadians. 6w Better or worse than the pro-
posed alternative compensation schemes it may be - but a
civil liberty? Hardly.
The profession's wisdom in matters related to client ser-
vice is, as well, increasingly called into question. Much of the
public rhetoric of leading bar spokesmen recently has been
devoted to preserving the independence of the bar from
public control. 61 The profession's fight to preserve its tradi-
tional forms of self-government, and to control the delivery
of legal services through a profession-administered Legal Aid
Plan, can both be interpreted as simple self-serving
manoeuvres designed to protect professional privileges and
incomes. I do not view the bar's efforts in that way. Rather, I
think that the profession is responding passionately to a
challenge to values which it has always accepted on faith, a
rO Canadian Bar National, March 22, 1975, No-Fault For Ontario Unlikely, at 3.
61 S.L. Robins, Independence of the Legal Profession (1971), 5 Law Society of Up-
per Canada Gazette 205, S.L. Robins, Our Profession and the Winds of Change
(1972). 6 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette 137; S.L. Robins, Our Profession
on Trial (1973), 7 Law Society of Upper Canada; Independent Legal Profession
Absolutely Necessary, Canadian Bar National, Sept. 13, 1974, at 5. For a general
treatment of the subject, see Orkin, op. cit. supra, note 14.
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faith which in times past was apparently shared by the
public. Now when that faith is challenged, its defenders are
often unable to meet criticism by rational responses,
because they are used to regarding their values as so fun-
damental as not to require a defence.
But if lawyers understand nothing, they do understand the
logic of enlightened self-interest. The bar has instinctively
grasped the possibility of compromise, of yielding a little
form in exchange for keeping much substance, of yielding
some substance rather than losing all. The issue of profes-
sional self-government nicely illustrates the point. In 1970, a
new statute was enacted in Ontario requiring the Law Socie-
ty to give an annual account of the manner in which the pro-
fession was discharging its public responsibilities; this ac-
count was to be reviewed by a body which embraced some
lay members.6 2 This statute was a more-or-less formal com-
promise agreed to by the Law Society in order to forestall
demands for more drastic incursions on its traditional
prerogative of self-government. By 1973, this concession of
form was shown to be unworkable,63 and it was replaced by
a modest concession of substance, which brought a small
number of lay representatives directly onto the profession's
governing body, the benchers 6 4
However, I do not mean to suggest that the abandonment
of the bar's stonewall defence of its own autonomy was
solely the product of tactical concessions. To some extent,
there has been a change of heart within the profession. The
logic of public accountability and participation obviously did
convince some key decision-makers in the profession, and
they have been able to secure acceptance of changes which
a decade ago would have been considered rank heresy.6 5
"Heresy" is a word which I have chosen deliberately. In
societies with deeply-rooted value systems, the fate of the
heretic is seldom pleasant. It may be as extreme as execution
or exile, or as relatively innocuous as mere social isolation or
disapproval. But the heretic will seldom simply be accepted
as a good fellow with odd views. The legal profession tends
62 The Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c.238, s.26(2)(h).
6 Robins, The Future of the Law Society Council (1973), 7 Law Society of Upper
Canada Gazette 87; Robins, The Treasurer Reports (1973), 7 Law Society of Up-
per Canada Gazette 97, at 109-110.
S.O. 1973, c.49, ss.1,2.
65 Independence of the Legal Profession, Federation of Law Societies Bulletin, April
28, 1973, at 3.
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to deal leniently with its heretics, but certainly does not clasp
them to its bosom.
Anyone who has attended a discussion sponsored by a
legal organization on a topic involving the bar's fundamental
beliefs will know what I mean. The sympathy of the audience
is usually clear; the "heretical" point of view is often
represented by someone who is not a member of the
organization, or at least of its elite; that person is often
young, or an academic, or a known controversialist who is a
lawyer-politician or a lawyer-journalist. Lawyers with these
heretical views are seldom found in the upper reaches of
prestigious law firms, seldom recognized as experts (even in
their own speciality), seldom involved in the social circles
and professional organizations of more conventional
lawyers. I would not suggest that they are regularly denied
professional courtesies by colleagues, court officials or
judges, but I would guess that from time to time, especially
in the heat of the battle, they do not receive the same degree
of tolerance and cooperation that they otherwise might.
To be sure, there is a wide gap between the mere ad-
vocacy of heretical or "deviant" beliefs, and professional ac-
tivity implementing those beliefs. It is when belief is
translated into action, and particularly into symbolic action,
that the reformer may encounter the greatest difficulty.
66
Amongst the symbols of the profession, several are easily
recognized as badges of membership by lawmen and
lawyers alike: conservative dress, well-appointed offices,
and the use of a legal dialect whose vocabulary embraces
characteristic double negatives, circumlocutions and
phrases such as "with respect", "in consideration of
which", or "per se". I do not mean to say that all lawyers
dress alike, have identical offices, or talk the same way. But I
do suggest that when unconventional belief is coupled with
conduct which affronts accepted symbols, there is a
substantial likelihood that the individual will be treated as a
deviant or heretical member of the profession. It is possible, I
am sure, to question the law society's right to control legal
aid, and yet remain a member in good standing of the profes-
sion's elite. It is possible to wear long hair, and dress and
speak quite informally, yet practice in some well-established
law firms. But I suspect it is much more difficult to do both of
See Greenwood, op. cit., supra, note 57 at 17; L. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of
Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press 1964); Arnold, The Symbols of
Government (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1935).
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those things at once and still be regarded as "sound" or
"professional". 6 7
Someone who combines known agnosticism about the
profession's values with professional behaviour and symbolic
conduct which give offence is likely to feel, justifiably
enough, that he is not really part of the profession. And this
feeling, in turn, may well produce a defensive reaction on his
part which further isolates him.
Consider this hypothetical chain of events. Lawyer X
dresses informally and behaves casually, as a matter of per-
sonal preference rather than political conviction. Some con-
servative lawyers have the notion that this demeanour is
characteristic of radicals. X is therefore perceived to be a
radical, and is accordingly made to feel unwelcome in con-
ventional legal social circles. Seeking a sympathetic milieu,
he gravitates towards others whose lifestyle coincides with
his own. Many of those who share his tastes do in fact have
radical ideas and he is influenced by them. He has now
fulfilled the originally erroneous prophecy of his conservative
colleagues.
Or consider another example. Lawyer Y's outward ap-
pearance is quite conservative. However, he develops a
critical view of his firm's reluctance to act in public interest
litigation or its commitment to the ideological position of its
major clients. In due course, his criticism leads to a break
with the firm: senior partners and clients will not work with
him; his career prospects are dim; and his struggle to
preserve his principles is more easily waged in a more sup-
portive practice situation with like-minded young colleagues.
In this new situation, he takes on the personal coloration of
his environment to demonstrate both his repudiation of his
former firm and his commitment to his new life.
This tendency of a culture to enforce conformity thus pro-
duces a counter-culture. Partly because its members are ex-
iled from the mainstream of the profession, partly because
they seek mutual support, a small but visible counter-culture
is emerging in the legal profession. Like the general social
and professional culture, this legal counter-culture has its
own values, behaviour norms and symbols. One of its
values, to somewhat overstate the case, is that conventional
legal institutions have failed society and need to be radically
See, e.g., Gaudy Garb is Criticized, Canadian Bar National, June 8, 1974, at 16;
Silverman, How to Select a Good Articling Position (1971), 19 Chitty's L. Rev.
344.
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transformed.6 Translated into behavioural norms, this value
is sometimes expressed by an aggressive manner in the cour-
troom, outspokenness in the press, and participation in
social or political movements of the left.6 9 And its symbols
are beards, or jeans, or law offices outside the usual profes-
sional precincts. Indeed, even the decision to call the
counter-culture organization the "Law Union" can be seen
as a symbol of militancy, of proletarian style, which is sure to
offend the legal establishment.
7 0
One of the choices confronting the lawyer-reformer, then,
is whether he wishes to live in the legal culture, or in the
counter-culture. On the one side, there is the risk that if the
individual remains in, though not of, the mainstream, he will
slowly and subtly surrender his beliefs and yield to various
temptations: the temptation of money, of course, but also of
prestige and - most seductive - of the professional
challenges offered by a sophisticated and wealthy clientele.
On the other side, there is the risk that total immersion in the
counter-culture exacts too high a price: the stern discipline
sometimes exercised by an embattled minority upon its
members; the frustration of fighting too many battles, all the
time, and with no real prospect of fundamental change; the
dissatisfaction of never having enough time or money to do
professional tasks thoroughly.
Two influences, occasionally contradictory, may help to
resolve the lawyer-reformer's dilemma.
First, there is the influence of clients. The legal culture and
counter-culture are not entirely self-generating and self-
sustaining. In their own way each reflects somewhat the
culture of the clientele with which it is associated. The dress,
speech and office decor of the conventional lawyer is in part,
determined by the expectation of his middle class and com-
6 See Law Union Constitution (1974), 1 Law Union News, No. 6 (new series); P.
Harris, "You Don't Have To Love The Law To Be A Lawyer", in J. Black ed.,
RadicalLawyers, (New York: Hearst Co., 1971) at 93; H. di Suvero, "The Move-
ment and The Legal System", in J. Black ed., Radical Lawyers, (New York:
Hearst Co., 1971) at 51; N. Dorsen, The Role of The Lawyer in America's Ghetto
Society (1972), 6 Law Society of Upper Canada Gazette at 118.
3 See, e.g., "Interview with William Kunstler", in J. Black ed., Radical Lawyers,
(New York: Hearst Co., 1971) at 301; Copeland, Why a Left Wing Lawyer Needs
the Law Union (1974), 1 Law Union News, No. 5 (new series).
7 Law Union Constitution: Resolution of Political Purpose (1974), 1 Law Union
News, No. 6 (new series); Zylberberg, B.C. Law Union Adopts Minimum Basis of
Unity (1974), 1 Law Union News, No. 6 (new series) (defining itself as "an
association of legal workers who share an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist
political analysis ... committed to struggle against sexism, racism, profes-
sionalism and elitism in ... [its members'] ... work.").
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mercial clients that their lawyer will have a certain ap-
pearance and behave in a certain way. So too is that of the
counter-culture lawyer. However, it is also true that some
middle class clients are intimidated by formal and opulent
surroundings, and that some working class clients may not
wish to see their lawyer dressed in jeans. Present and emerg-
ing patterns of general social roles and relationships, hence
of client expectations, may ultimately assist the breakdown
of stereotypes, and of other cultural symbols, within the pro-
fession. In a more pluralistic social atmosphere, the
reformer's prospects for survival are enhanced.
But the influence of clients becomes increasingly impor-
tant as access to them becomes increasingly difficult. With
the rapid expansion of the profession has come increasing
concern, especially amongst its new recruits, for job pro-
spects. The limited number of positions with prestigious
large firms seems to be forcing more and more young
lawyers to open their own offices, and to cater for the
modest needs of poor and middle class, as opposed to cor-
porate, clients. Such careers are not new to the legal profes-
sion; they are simply returning to view after several decades
of relative eclipse. 71 In the present context, however, what is
important is the impact of changing patterns of practice
upon lawyer-reformers.
Either of two tendencies might prevail. On the one hand,
involvement with the realities of general practice might pro-
duce acceptance of law as a modest, indeed conservative,
career and undermine reformist tendencies. On the other,
enforced alienation from the challenges and rewards of the
prestigious firms may have a radicalizing influence. But it is
certain that in one way or the other, the client culture in
which increasing numbers of young lawyers are to be im-
mersed will generate profound changes in the culture of the
profession.7
2
Second, there is the influence of certain values deeply
rooted in the legal culture. The value of service is one of
these, due process is another, and professional competence
a third.
So far as service is concerned, once the profession comes
to perceive - as it is slowly perceiving - that some aspects
71 Arthurs, Williams 8 Taman, The Toronto Legal Profession: An Exploratory
Survey (1971), 21 U. of T.L.J. 498 at 522, etseq.
72 The interaction of legal and client cultures, and of professional recruitment pat-
terns, is brilliantly explored in J.A. Auerbach, Unequal Justice - Lawyers and
Social Change in Modern America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976)
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of legal culture stand in the way of service, and have ceased
to be functional, they will be swept aside. Historic
precedents include the refusal of early Canadian lawyers to
establish a divided profession or to wear wigs. 73 A contem-
porary example is the recent relaxation of traditional prohibi-
tions against advertising to permit community legal services
to reach out more effectively to their prospective clients.
74
So far as due process is concerned, the profession is reluc-
tant to mount formal disciplinary proceedings against so-
meone, however offensive or abrasive, without proof of
some specific violation of its formal rules.75 And it has been
circumspect in using the open-ended power it is given in
almost all provincial statutes to discipline for either "profes-
sional misconduct" or "conduct unbecoming" a lawyer. 7
6
This due process-based restraint tends to give considerable
latitude to deviant lawyers, and to avoid what might other-
wise be regrettable confrontations between the mainstream
and the counter-culture.
Respect for professional competence is a third value
which may help to permit the lawyer-reformer to feel at
home within the profession. Conceding that he sometimes
may not be given his professional due because of perceived
heretical tendencies, the reformer may come to win respect
by being effective. But this may place him once again in a
dilemma. With respect comes the prospect of a lucrative
practice; with such a practice, reformist activity may either
be a luxury for which there is no longer time, or a hypocritical
hobby, soon abandoned because it comes to lack credibility.
Set against these values is a behavioural norm which is
widely practiced by lawyers - the norm of deference. But
deference is not one of those qualities which comes easily to
reformers. Often their motivation in pursuing the cause of
reform is a feeling of hostility, even contempt, towards
systems and structures which they perceive as unfair, ineffi-
cient or insensitive. It is therefore difficult for reformers to
act deferentially towards individuals who embody those
systems and institutions, although any of them may have
redeeming personal or professional virtues: the judge who is
reactionary but patient and courteous, the senior partner
7 B. Laskin, The British Tradition in Canadian Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 1969)
at 31.
74 C.B.A., C.P.C., Rule 13, para. 7; Professional Conduct Handbook, op. cit. supra,
note 15 ruling 3(3).
7 Orkin, op. cit. supra, note 14.
74 Preface, C.B.A., C.P.C. at vii.
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who is insensitive but brilliant, the junior who is offensively
ambitious, but who undeniably gets the job done quickly and
accurately.
This tendency to define people in terms of their perceived
roles is not restricted to reformers, of course, but it does
complicate their status within the profession. For the
reformer often does not merely attack "the system" in the
abstract, but as well individuals who are liked and admired
and virtues which are prized.
So far as individuals are concerned, it is of course true that
some of history's most despicable characters liked dogs,
played sonatas or were genuinely devoted to their profession
or craft; these admirable personal qualities do not cancel out
villainy. But I am not referring to villains within the legal pro-
fession. I am describing individuals who merely do their daily
work well, in accordance with the prevailing ethic, often
without much thought about its ultimate social impact,
perhaps with limited ability to change the course of events,
but with no malice in their hearts. Many of us are guilty of
failing to give these individuals their due: we have made
"corporation lawyer" a pejorative term, a synonym for
"hired gun"; we have excoriated judges as "tools of the
corporate elite". We have often overstated our case, and
thus earned the predictable personal animosity of individuals
who, by their own lights, have given much to their profes-
sion and society. And this personal animosity, in turn, is
translated into hostility towards those who abused them,
and the causes espoused by their critics.
Perhaps the rhetoric of reform has been counterproduc-
tive in this respect. Perhaps some of these individuals might
have been won over by evidence or argument, or at least
persuaded to be neutral rather than hostile to reform. And
yet I do not wish to make too much of the point. The
reformer's journey is a lonely one, and it is often fueled by in-
dignation, a highly volatile substance. If reformers cannot
become angry from time to time, they may be unable to sus-
tain their momentum. And, to look at the matter the other
way 'round, if personal relationships are to take priority over
principles, there is a ready-made reason for abandoning all
efforts to change the status quo.
I have also mentioned the failure of reformers to be
deferential to virtues traditionally prized within the profes-
sion: courtesy, hard work and profession skill.
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Courtesy is, of course, related to the preservation of per-
sonal relationships, but it is something different.7 7 It is a way
of depersonalizing or objectifying a relationship, of remin-
ding both parties that however they may feel towards each
other, they must still transact their business in an orderly
fashion. At a minimum, courtesy may thus make for efficien-
cy. At a maximum, however, it may produce a better
substantive result. As a French philosopher once remarked,
tomany a man became a good man by leading a life of
hypocrisy." By pretending to be good, by imitating
goodness, people may internalize the values of the role and
actually become good. For "goodness", in the context of
the courts we may substitute "fairness", or in the context of
the law office "social awareness". Courtesy may have been
sold short by reformers.
So too hard work and professional skill. I do not mean, to
be sure, that reformers are either lazy or incompetent. Far
from it. Many work an exhausting schedule and with ad-
mirable effectiveness. But as abstract virtues, hard work and
professional skill are often disparaged.78 This is because both
of them are lifestyle issues. The professional has traditionally
been career-oriented. He has been too willing, too often, to
sacrifice friends, family, cultural interests and community in-
volvement because of an all-consuming preoccupation with
his career. This ordering of personal priorities is seen by
reformers as a reflection of the general malaise of society:
business is the highest virtue; all else is secondary.
Moreover, careers pursued without regard to the world
around us, or to inner personal development, are unlikely to
produce socially responsive or humane professionals. The
decision to make a career is thus interpreted accurately, by
both reformer and conventional lawyer, as the decision to
accept the status quo.
It need not be so. Hard work and professional skill are im-
portant for both reformers and conventional lawyers. The
problem is that pursuit of a career may reach the point of
diminishing returns, unless it is linked to more humanistic ac-
tivities. And such activities, in turn, are potentially subver-
sive of the status quo. The lawyer who is close to his family
may become involved in issues of women's rights, educa-
7Id., Rule 16.
78 See, e.g., Zylberberg, Mind Survival for Law Students (1974), 1 Law Union
News, No. 5 (new series); Copeland, Why a Left Wing Lawyer Needs The Law
Union (1974), 1 Law Union News, No. 5 (new series); Swaigen, Articling and Bar
Ad Course Exposed (1974), 1 Law Union News, No. 5 (new series).
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tional reform or police harrassment of young people. The
lawyer who reads widely or patronizes the arts may become
motivated to seek reforms in the laws of censorship. The
lawyer who belongs to a ratepayers' group may be drawn in-
to community action. These reformist issues may become as
professionally significant for the lawyer as the conventional
problems of his conventional clients.
IV
"To the barricades" has been the revolutionists' traditional
rallying cry. It has seldom summoned forth many lawyers;
only a modest contingent marches to the drumbeat of
reform. I have tried to point out that it is not the formal in-
stitutions and ideology of the bar which determine the fate of
the lawyer-reformer so much as the culture of the profes-
sion. Perhaps I might finally suggest that law schools have
the potential, only partly realized, to do much for the cause
of reform. They cannot change the law society or amend the
Code of Professional Conduct, but they can play a critical
role in reshaping the culture of the profession - if they know
why, if they wish to, if they dare to.
